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This paper uses data from in-depth group interviews with family planning workers in
Bangladesh to demonstrate both the dysfunctional influence of family planning targets
on quality of care as well as the strong connection between targets and the manage-
ment system. The findings show that the presence of targets influenced the advice and
information workers provided, pushing them towards long-term methods such as steril-
isation and the IUD rather than helping clients select methods most suited to their
needs. The paper then shows the connection between the target system and the struc-
ture of official and unofficial incentives, the pattern of supervision, the system of
accountability and a hierarchically organised and gender-biased organisational cul-
ture. The authors argue that unless these underlying managerial determinants of qual-
ity of care are addressed, the hope for reaching the goals of the International Conference
on Population and Development (ICPD) will remain illusory.
’To understand the most challenging managerial issues requires seeing
the whole system that generates the issues.’ (Senge)
* The study of female family planning workers upon which this paper is based was
designed and implemented in collaboration with Professor Rushikesh Maru who, at
the time the data were collected, was Acting Director of the Extension Project of the
International centre for Diarrhoeal Diseases Research, Bangladesh. Professor Maru had
carefully reviewed these data prior to the time he assumed the directorship of the In-
dian Institute of Health Management Research in Jaipur in 1996. His sudden death in
April 1998 remains incomprehensible. His profound understanding of the field of fam-
ily planning management inspired the writing of this paper; but its faults are our own.
We gratefully acknowledge Rezina Mita’s care and diligence in collecting the data
upon which this paper is based, and also wish to thank Shameem Abbassy, Daniel
Kabira and Denise Sanderson for research assistance.
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Introduction
As part of a global movement to bring about a change towards greater
quality of care in family planning programmes, targets for the recruit-
ment of contraceptive acceptors have been widely criticised. For ex-
ample, Khallil and Myntti (1994) argue that ’quotas have led to abuses
in many countries and adversely affect the quality of health care pro-
vided since they cause providers to ignore the user’s viewpoint, tamper
with reproductive rights, and pay little attention to presenting a choice
of method, unbiased information, or clinically appropriate services’.
India and Bangladesh, two nations in which the target system has been
a core component of the national family planning programme, have
recently shifted to a target-free approach in an effort to improve over-
all programme quality. Such a policy shift constitutes an important
ingredient of efforts to bring about a greater service orientation in
programmes. This paper uses data from in-depth group interviews with
family planning workers in Bangladesh to demonstrate both the dys-
functional influence of targets on quality of care in community-based
service provision as well as the strong connection between targets and
the management system. Including a management perspective in the
analysis of targets broadens the understanding of what change is needed
in order to build service-oriented programmes. We argue that abolishing
targets alone does not suffice. Substantial changes in bureaucratic and
management practices are needed if programmes are to obtain improve-
ments in quality of care and assure the respect for reproductive rights
to which nations committed themselves at the ICPD in Cairo in 1994.
The data used in this paper are derived from group interviews con-
ducted in 1994 with women employed as community-based outreach
workers in the government family planning programme in Bangla-
desh. Eleven group interviews were undertaken, with a total of 56
Family Welfare Assistants (FWAs). Twenty-six of these had worked
in this position for many years; 30 had been recently recruited. Eight
of the group interviews were conducted in areas that received techni-
cal assistance from the Extension Project of the International Centre
for Diarrhoeal Disease Research, Bangladesh, including training and
record keeping (for a description of this project see Haaga and Maru
[1996] and Phillips et al. [1984]). The remaining three sessions were
conducted in comparison areas. 1
Family planning fieldworkers were responsible for conducting regu-
lar household visits with women of reproductive age in their assigned
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work areas, which, at the time of the interviews, consisted of a popu-
lation of approximately 4,000 people per worker. If fieldwork was
conducted regularly, workers could visit each eligible woman once
every two months. Workers were responsible for home-based educa-
tion and distribution of oral contraception, condoms and, in project
intervention areas, injectables. Intrauterine devices (IUDS, referred to
as Copper T) was available at the nearby subcentre and both sterilisa-
tion (tubal ligation) and IUDs at the subdistrict health complex.
Fieldworkers were also required to facilitate access to clinic services,
accompanying sterilisation or IUD patients at the day of their proce-
dure or taking women with side effects or complications to clinic
facilities.
The Effects of the Target System on
Contraceptive Choice
The imperatives laid out by the target system were clearly embedded
in the field workers’ outlook and this had profound impact on the
advice they gave to local women about method choice, one of the
central elements of quality of care (Bruce 1990). Most respondents
indicated that they discussed the permanent and provider-controlled
methods first when they visited women in their local communities,
and then slowly progressed to the user-controlled ones. The predomi-
nant motive behind this advice was not the women’s wishes or cir-
cumstances, but the need to fulfil sterilisation and IUD targets.
Workers also knew that they had to address women’s desires. Given
the pressures to meet targets, however, the woman’s choice tended to
be of secondary importance. In the mind of the worker the very con-
cept of ’choice’ had been twisted to suit the logic of targets: 
’
Worker: First of all, you should try for long-term methods. It is
well and good if she accepts Copper T, but if she does not like to
accept the Copper T then you will propose injection to her. If she
agrees to take injection, it is well and good, but if she does not then
you will give her pills or condoms. In this way, you will give her
the method of her choice.
Responsiveness to the client occurs within the boundaries of the
hierarchy of family planning methods imposed by the demographically
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focused target system. Some workers acknowledged that the client’s
choice should be paramount. But the target system did not allow them
to give priority to client needs:
.
Moderator: What do you do when a woman says ‘Apa (sister), please
decide, I do not know the method which I should use?’
Worker 1: In that case we talk about operation and Copper T. But
I always explain all the methods to her and she picks up one; then I
check her with the screening checklist. If that suits her then I give
that and if she gets side effect then I change to a method of my
choice if that suits her.
Worker 2: I do the same.
Worker 3: If the woman depends on me then I advise her to do the
ligation; if she does not agree then I give her the Copper T.
Worker 4: Client’s choice is first but because of target pressure we
need to push the clients towards our choice.
Workers 1 and 2: Yes, Apa, that is why we do not like targets.
Targets also led to a distortion of information provided about moth-
ods. Fieldworkers gave a more favorable representation of the long-
acting IUD, and discredited other methods, in the following case, the
injectable cntraceptive:
Moderator: How much information should women be given be-
fore they decide what method to use?
Worker: When we find a baby in her arms then we tell her that if she
takes pills then her breast will go dry, if she takes injection then
also breast will be dry and monthly menstruation shall stop. If
Copper T is inserted, then it will be better as there is no side effect.
The worker was correct in implying that a breastfeeding woman
should not use oral contraceptives containing oestrogen and progestin.
However, she was wrong in suggesting that injectables are inappropri-
ate for breastfeeding women (progestin-based injectables can be used
six weeks after childbirth in breastfeeding women) and that there are
no side effects with the use of the IUD. Providing accurate and bal-
anced information about contraceptive methods is one of the impor-
tant components of quality of services, but targets undermined the
worker’s inclination to do so. Instead, targets created incentives to
provide biased information, thereby contributing to the extensive
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pattern of misinformation about contraceptive methods that was wide-
spread in these rural areas.
Targets also caused conflict among providers over clients’ method
choice. Fieldworkers who had been trained in community-based in-
jectable provision were serving a considerable number of injectable
clients. They were pleased to have these clients because they found
that women were less interested in the IUD and in sterilisation than in
the past. The paramedic (Family Welfare Visitor) at the subcentre, by
contrast, was trained in IUD provision, had an IUD target and re-
ceived special incentive payments for every IUD she inserted. As a
consequence, she was interested only in providing IUDs and fieldworkers
reported that their injectable clients did not receive appropriate care
from the paramedic. For example:
Worker 1: Our clients are badly treated by visitors in the subcentre
and satellite clinic. We send our clients there for necessary medi-
cines and treatment but instead they get rough behaviour. After-
wards, when we visit our clients after two months in the field, they
charge us by saying that we sent them to the subcentre or satellite .
clinics for treatment but they had received nothing but rough be-
haviour.
Worker 2: The clients then abuse us. We are also abused by our
neighbours. The visitors give more importance to the Copper T
IUD.
Moderator: Why are the Visitors so much interested in the Cop-
per T IUD?
Worker 1: The Visitors show interest in the Copper T because
they have a fixed Copper T target to achieve and they get some
money per patient. When our pill clients go to them for medicines,
they insert the Copper T IUD in them against their will. The clients
prefer taking injections to using the Copper T. When we go to see
them they scold us severely. They [the women] say, ’The impor-
tant thing is to stop births and it can be done by using any method
other than the Copper T or sterilisation. Why should we use only
the Copper T?’
In order to convince women to adopt the Copper T, paramedics
were reported to give inaccurate information about injectables, saying
for example that they ’cause problems with her artery system’, or that
they are ’likely to make the blood impure’. Such information was
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obviously worrisome to women and tended to lead them to switch
methods unnecessarily, or to stop contraceptive use entirely. In one
case a worker reported how four of her clients changed to the Copper
T because of such advice, and when they subsequently experienced
problems, they switched back to the injectable.
By establishing differential incentives for paramedics and fieldworkers,
the targets acted as a barrier for effective cooperation among programme
staff. Method choice was distorted and as a consequence women suf-
fered rather than benefited from care.
The requirement to recruit acceptors of IUDs and sterilisation ex-
erted paramount influence on the work style of rural family planning
fieldworkers. These patterns of work contrast sharply with the ideals
of a client-oriented quality of care approach in which providers have
the role of sharing information and helping clients reach a decision
that suits their needs and concerns (Ward et al. 1998). In a quality of
care-based approach providers do not come to the interaction with an
externally imposed criterion for the selection of a contraceptive method.
In practice, of course, family planning providers even in the best set-
tings are likely to have biases that may affect interactions with their
clients. When method choice is dictated by formalised targets for cer-
tain methods, however, the possibility of responding to the client’s
individual situation is particularly constrained. Moreover, women are
put at risk of infection and other harmful consequences when they are
subjected to unnecessary medical procedures for the sole reason of
meeting a contraceptive targets.
The Impact of Target-focused Supervision
Most community-based workers experienced intense pressure from
their immediate supervisors and programme officers to fulfil targets.~ 2
The monthly supervisory meetings consisted of constant reminders to
pay attention to targets and included threats that salaries would be
withheld unless workers recruited the required number of sterilisa-
tion and IUD clients:
Worker 1: You see, I may fail to fulfil my target for sterilisation,
but I may exceed the number of injections from four to 10, or pills
from four to 10, but there is no credit for that, because I could not
have that one client targeted for an operation.
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Moderator: Is there any pressure about fulfilling targets? What type
of pressure?
Worker 2: Instead of asking about the other family planning methods,
I will be asked: ’How many ligations did you bring this month?
Why couldn’t you bring one single ligation? In that case, you won’t
receive any pay this month’.
Worker 3: They think we cannot motivate people or do not care
to. We just roam around and then take our salary. This is their
opinion of us.
Moderator: For how long do they halt your payment?
Worker 1: Until we can get our target of ligation.
Moderator: Then how do you get your salary?
Worker 3: We have to go through a lot of problems.
Moderator: Like what? Please explain.
Worker 2: We pay the clients more, using our own money to
motivate them to have ligation.
The message was clear: workers must bring in the specified number
of IUD and sterilisation cases or they will not receive their salary on
time. Quality of care and a focus on client needs were lost in the proc-
ess. Under pressure to find sterilisation clients, some workers felt that
they had to enlarge the pool of women they contacted with little re-
gard to whether the candidates for the method were appropriate:
I have a fixed target for ligation. I always try to fulfil my target.
When pressure will come on me to achieve the target, then I am
compelled to procure a client without taking any consideration of
her age. Sometimes, we get over-aged women for ligation as we are
compelled to do so. We spend a lot of our time in procuring a
ligation client.
The impact of targets on the recruitment of older sterilisation cli-
ents for whom such.a procedure is irrelevant has been reported else-
where. But it deserves to be reiterated that such procedures are not
only irrelevant from a demographic perspective but are harmful inter-
ventions, putting women at unnecessary risk for medical complica-
tions.
Another respondent provided an example of how she encouraged
women to switch from injectables to the IUD in order to do well
during a ’Copper T week’ when workers were asked to recruit two
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IUD cases, and told that ’efficient’ FWAs should recruit more. Eager
to be one of the ’efficient’ FWAs, she talked at great length to two
women, but after spending a long time with them failed to persuade
them to have an IUD inserted. At this point it occurred to her that
one way of recruiting additional cases might be to convince injectable
clients to change to the IUD:
I went to my house... when I met a woman who was coming to
take the injection. I approached her and started motivating her by
saying that she had already taken the injection twice. I suggested
the Copper T insertion to her. She did not say yes or no. At last she
agreed to accept the Copper T. Then I went to another client who
also agreed to my proposal. I thus could convert five clients. The
Copper T was inserted in all of them. It was a wonderful experi-
ence in my service life.
In some cases the pressure to produce IUD acceptors led workers to
tell outright lies:
Worker 1: Recently, there has been much pressure as regards inser-
tion of Copper T. We are given a target of Copper Ts to achieve at
the rate of three to four cases per month. Because of its various side
effects, the Copper T has lost its popularity. Women do not like it
any longer. Therefore, when we go to insert it, we do not tell that
we are inserting a Copper T. We tell our clients that a capsule will
be inserted inside the uterus. They are afraid of the Copper T because
it causes bleeding. So we tell them that a capsule will be inserted
inside the uterus after taking out the Copper T. We also tell that
there is a string tied at the top of the capsule that will gradually be
dissolved within eight years when cover of the capsule will be taken
out. Our clients become convinced on hearing all these false things
from us.
Worker 2: We actually insert Copper Ts without their knowledge.
Some respondents acknowledged that these patterns lead to a dis-
tortion of services and some argued that such practices serve no
purpose:
I know that if I do not get a Copper T IUD client then my salary
shall be withheld. Then, moving from one place to another, I
285
somehow manage to get a client on the condition that the IUD
inserted will be taken out after 10 days. The purpose of doing so is




We do injustice to our clients of other methods in the matter of
timely supplies. Since we do not provide timely supplies to our
clients because of our exclusive engagement with recruiting a ligation
client, we find that eight or 10 women using the pill have become
pregnant. Such pressure is not at all advisable.
Some field workers also reported that supervisors encourage some
of these recruitment techniques, and that at times workers felt help-
less in the face of pressure from their supervisors to engage in such
’catch-as-catch-can’ tactics:
My injection client has lost her husband. Why should she take pills
or injections after the death of her husband? The officers insist on
her taking pills even now. The client opposes on the plea that she
will be criticised by her neighbors if she takes pills now. Finally she
did not take anything and nothing had happened. In such circum-
stances, we have to remain as a silent spectator as we do not get any
strength to express our opinions. We do not get any support from
our officers in such a situation.
By nature of their position fieldworkers were close to the local popu-
lation. They knew they could only succeed if they maintained cordial
relations with community women. As one woman put it: ’Clients are
our gods.’ In the above case, the worker knew that a widow who uses
oral contraceptives would be subject to intense criticism by her neigh-
bours, and recognised that pressuring clients will not help to build
strong relations between herself and the community. Supervisors, by
contrast, were not in regular contact with the local community, did
not have to recruit acceptors, and their performance rating was not
dependent on the goodwill of the local people. As a consequence, they
were less sensitive to local opinion than the fieldworker.
The pressure to recruit acceptors of long-term methods had been so
intense that it affected workers’ perception of what is meant by quality.
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In one group interview, the following dialogue occurred when workers
were asked what they understood about the phrase quality of care:
Worker 1: It means a change from one method to another method,
that is, from the pill to the injection, or from the injection to the
Copper T.
Moderator: Can you explain a bit more?
Worker 2: Say, if one switched from the pill to the injection, which
is a better method, and from that to the Copper T followed by
ligation...
Moderator: You mean going to a more permanent method?
Worker 2: Right. This is improvement in the quality of method,
the quality of services.
Moderator: Do you all agree?
All: Yes.
Moderator: Did you learn this from some training or anyone else?
Worker 3: We didn’t hear of it formally.
Moderator: Where did you hear of this?
Worker: Sirs [supervisors/officers] discuss this at the meetings.
There was no confusion in the minds of the worker as to what was
important to their immediate supervisors and higher level programme
officials. What mattered was meeting quotas of new acceptors of a
long-acting or permanent method of contraception. A concern for serv-
ice quality and reproductive rights, by contrast, was not emphasised.
The Managerial Roots of the Target System
This literature has highlighted the connection of targets to the demo-
graphic objectives of the family planning programmes and drawn atten-
tion to their deleterious impact on the quality of services (Khallil and
Myntti 1994). What has been less clearly understood is that target-
based performance measures and the emphasis on long-acting methods
are closely tied to the management practices of complex and resource-
poor public sector bureaucracies. Appreciation of this connection,
however, is essential in any effort to improve the overall quality of
service delivery in the context of large-scale public sector programmes.
Targets provided the managerial underpinning of the family plan-
ning programme in Bangladesh by establishing a mechanism for moti-
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vating staff, for assuring accountability, and for evaluating individuals
and programme units. All organisations must communicate a set of
goals and objectives to their members and evaluate their performance
against these standards. Quantitative sterilisation and IUD targets estab-
lished performance standards and a mechanism for holding a large staff
of workers and supervisors accountable. Some of the workers indi-
rectly recognised this when they stated that they are not against the
target system because it provides direction for their work, but they do
not like the pressure associated with it.
The interest of the programme in sterilisation and IUDs had two
foundations: one demographic, the other bureaucratic or operational.
Sterilisation and IUDs are permanent or long-acting methods and there-
fore of great interest to a demographically-oriented programme. From
a bureaucratic or operational perspective these methods are of interest
because they can be more readily ’checked’ than other forms of con-
traception. They are clinic-based and require the involvement of more
than one provider. In a bureaucracy where the potential for fake re-
porting is large and where supervisors must either rely on workers’
reports or undertake extensive field checks, IUD and sterilisation cases
are more readily subject to reliable verification than pill or condom
use. Systematic field checks are not easy in a large and dispersed field
programme, requiring a much stronger supervisory field presence in
Bangladesh than was implemented even in areas where the programme
received outside support. The emphasis on sterilisation and IUD targets
as a performance measure also served the interests of supervisors whose
commitment to more complex, field-based supervision was extremely
weak.
Although injectables are also provider-controlled, when they are
provided in the home they are less readily checked by supervisors and
therefore of less interest to a bureaucratic system that has limited
capacity to check work in a large field-based programme. Sterilisation
and IUDs are also less costly than injectables or pills, especially if these
methods are used for a long period of time.
In a more general sense, the target system functioned as a substitute
for effective, supportive and problem solving supervision. Supervisors
and higher level managers were not oriented towards providing the
type of work environment which encourages field staff towards high
standards of quality of care and performance more generally. Respond-
ents consistently lamented the lack of support they received from super-
visors :
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, Worker: Sirs praise those who can show the highest contraceptive
prevalence rate, but those who work hard but cannot produce
the highest prevalence rate that is never seen by the Sirs. They
never want to know what was the worker’s problem and how to
solve it. ’
Or:
Worker: If we request the Family Planning Inspector to show us
the correct method of a work, then he does not give us necessary
instructions, rather, he will say, ’Oh! You have been working for
such a long time but don’t know these things.’ He will never ex-
plain anything. He is never helpful to our work.
Or:
Worker: If they threaten us and call us worthless in front of our
clients, the clients will never listen to us. We become very sad when
we get such behaviour from them. We have not told about this to
anybody. If you go to a village and show me respect, then the women
of that village will show more respect to me. They will then give
more importance to what we tell them and that will be advanta-
geous for the progress of our work. On the contrary, if you go to a
village and start threatening us then the women will neither listen
to us nor will they put any importance to what we say.... We may
_ 
be subordinates but we also have our own dignity and self-respect.
In the field of management it has been consistently argued that ’to
motivate the worker to peak performance, it is equally important that
management set and enforce on itself high standards for its own per-
formance of those functions that determine the worker’s ability to
perform’ (Drucker 1968: 365). Such supportive and exemplary super-
vision, however, is not a strong point of the public sector family plan-
ning bureaucracy of Bangladesh. Supervision is predominantly punitive
rather than problem solving in nature, and targets are used as a manage-
rial short cut for effective supervision. More generally, female
fieldworkers were often viewed as convenient subjects who could be
blamed for programme failures: For example:
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Moderator: Do your supervisors give recognition to your official
work?
Worker 1: They do not recognise our work at all. Their version is
that FWAs do not work at all; all the work is done by them.
Worker 2: On the day of the meeting, they openly say that we do
not do any work. If we do not work then how come the CPR
[contraceptive prevalance rate] increases day by day?
Worker 1: They do not reply to our questions. If anyone of us
protests, they become irritated.
Moderator: Do they not appreciate any of your good work?
Worker 3: No, we have never received any appreciation for our
good deeds.
Worker 2: We pass the time before the arrival of our officer in a
meeting in gossiping, when we feel peace. As soon as the officer
arrives in the meeting our peace is disturbed. The meeting usually
starts with discussions of the faults committed by FWAs, followed
by threats and rebukes for FWAs. It appears that all the responsi-
bilities lie with the FWAs.
Workers also were a readily available source from whom illicit pay-
ments could be extracted. Fieldworkers repeatedly reported that they
were expected to make informal payments to their supervisors, other
higher level officers, or office staff:
Worker 1: When we spend 100 Taka for the patient and submit a
reimbursement voucher, ultimately I will get only 25 Taka.
Moderator: What happens with the rest of the 75 Taka?
Worker 1: The rest goes to the office personnel.
Worker 2: We have a lot of problems to get our money. We
have to pay this one and that one to keep the work progressing
so that we can get our money.
Worker 3: Listen to a story. I was trying to get a bill cleared and
I had to give once 600 then again 500 to the officer. I asked the
officer: ’Sir, why do you take so much?’.... See, among 3,000
Taka, I had to spend more than 1,000 Taka. I was so sad.
Above, we already discussed that supervisors withheld salaries to
motivate workers to fulfil their targets. Closer analysis reveals that
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targets were used as a convenient pretext which allowed supervisors
and officials to obtain illegal cuts from the workers salary. This is
clearly articulated in the following two quotations:
Target is good as it increases the enthusiasm of a worker to do
more work. But it is more used to take money from us.
Or:
When higher authority wants to have some money then they think
of putting the pressure on targets.
The practice of extracting illegal payments was not limited to the
family planning programme, nor was it a direct outgrowth of the tar-
get system. Demands for unofficial payments are a pervasive pattern
in the bureaucracy in Bangladesh more generally, in part because sala-
ries are extremely low. The quantitative acceptor targets contributed
towards creating an organisational climate which readily lent itself to
such unofficial resource extraction from fieldworkers. This system also
created special vulnerabilities in a highly gender-biased organisational
structure where women occupy the lowest rank in the hierarchy and
their supervisors and officers are men. In providing a rationale for
withholding workers’ salaries, or issuing a ’show cause’ notice, targets
increased the need for these women to come to the subdistrict health
complex to explain themselves to an officer. With greater need for
such visits, fieldworkers’ risk of sexual harassment, which was widely,
though cautiously, discussed among respondents, increased. Their com-
ments made clear that they felt a strong need to guard against visiting
officers alone.
Targets should not be viewed as the cause of either the prevalent
demand for illegal payments or of the considerable threat of sexual
harassment. These practices existed independently from the system of
quotas for contraceptive acceptors. However, by creating apparent
justifications for withholding salaries and issuing ’show cause’ notices,
targets increased the worker’s risk of becoming the victim of either
one or both these practices. Women who occupied the lowest posi-
tion in the occupational hierarchy of the family planning programme
in a society where women’s status is low, were thus jeopardised by
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targets in ways that are only apparent once these larger contextual
managerial and social issues are considered.
Conclusion: The Need for a Systems Change
The target system established a deep-rooted set of motivations, pro-
viding the engine that drove the large government family planning
programme in Bangladesh. As the above evidence has shown, the tar-
get system was closely linked to the structure of official and unofficial
rewards, the pattern of supervision, the system of accountability, and
a hierarchically organised and gender-biased organisational culture.
Consequently, abolishing targets does not suffice to improve the qual-
ity of services.
When targets are removed but the rest of the management system
remains unchanged, the family planning programme is left with the
same dysfunctional organisational patterns that have generated many
of the problem areas discussed in this paper. Where management prac-
tices are punitive, cooperative interaction and support are lacking. and
fieldworkers are subject to wage extortion and sexual harassment, re-
moval of family planning acceptor quotas are an insufficient remedy
to move the programme to a greater level of quality of care. Policy
decisions to remove targets certainly constitute an important initia-
tive. However, this policy change must be accompanied by new direc-
tions for service delivery and management, including a new system of
motivation and rewards, new values and patterns of accountability.
Unless these underlying managerial determinants of quality of care are
addressed, the hope for reaching ICPD goals will remain illusory.
Notes
1. The interviews were conducted at the project office at the subdistrict level by a
moderator with extensive experience in group interviews. A detailed interview guide-
line was used. Interviews lasted between five and a half and seven hours, and in-
cluded a lunch and other refreshments. Interviews were taped and subsequently
translated into English and transcribed.
2. What we discuss here is the predominant pattern. There were also workers who
reported that the pressure had lessened or was only periodically intense, and some
did not mention these pressures at all.
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